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Abstract 
Pliskin et al. (in preparation) found evidence to support the belief that hope and fear justify 
left–right ideology and that this belief motivates people to experience hope and fear, 
respectively. However, their experiment examined participants’ motivation to experience 
ideology-congruent emotions by using only politically relevant stimuli. The current study 
aims to determine whether leftists and rightists believe that hope and fear justify their 
ideologies respectively and whether they are thus more motivated to experience those 
emotions beyond the relevant targets of these emotions. This is investigated by a conducted 
experiment that required participants to rank article headlines, in order of participants’ 
reading desirability, the headlines either contained politically-relevant or -irrelevant 
information and induced either hope or fear. Results provide evidence for the influence of 
political ideology on preference for fear- and hope-inducing article headlines, in both the 
politically-relevant and politically-irrelevant conditions. However, this effect is not mediated 
by participants’ belief that hope or fear justifies their ideology. After controlling for the 
demographic variable of gender, the significant verdict turns non-significant. This thesis 
compares the present findings to previous findings, discusses those results, states its own 
limitations, implication and offers a conclusion. 
Keywords: Hope, Fear, Ideology, Emotion Regulation, Integral Emotions, Incidental 
Emotions, Motivated Reasoning 
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All people experience the positive emotion of hope and the negative emotion of fear 
at crucial points in their lives. However, people’s political views can shape their responses to 
these emotions. Research has demonstrated that the ideology-related motivation to 
experience certain emotions can occur when people want to justify their ideology (Tamir, 
2016). The studies that Pliskin, Nabet, Jost, Tamir, and Halperin conducted (in preparation) 
indicate that people tend to be motivated to experience emotions that are congruent with their 
ideology (leftism or rightism), notably when they believe that these emotions justify their 
ideology. Their studies illustrate that leftists believe that hope justifies their ideology more 
than rightists do, which motivates them to experience hope in the context of intergroup 
conflict. In opposition, rightists believe that fear justifies their ideology more than leftists do, 
which motivates them to experience fear in the context of intergroup conflict.  
However, these studies examined participants’ motivation to experience ideology-
congruent emotions by using only politically relevant stimuli; they do not provide insight into 
whether people with a rightist or leftist worldview feel that hope or fear justifies their 
ideology and are therefore more motivated to experience hope or fear, regardless of the 
politically relevant targets of these emotions.  
Would a rightist who believes that fear justifies his or her ideology, experience more 
motivation to read an article concerning the danger of rising refugee rates (inducing fear), 
than an article on immigrants providing a major boost to economic growth (inducing hope), 
when the article topics are both related to politics? Furthermore would a rightist who believes 
that fear justifies his or her ideology, experience more motivation to read an article 
concerning rising cancer rates (inducing fear) than an article on finding a cure for cancer 
(inducing hope), when the article topics are both non-related to politics? In other words, are 
rightists more motivated to experience fear in general (i.e., even in non-political contexts)?  
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In contrast, would a leftist, who believes that hope justifies his or her ideology, 
experience more motivation to read the article about immigrants providing a major boost to 
economic growth (inducing hope) when presented with the politically-relevant article topics? 
Additionally, would a leftist experience more motivation to read the article on finding a cure 
for cancer (inducing hope) when presented with the politically-irrelevant article topics? Are 
leftists more motivated to experience hope in general (i.e., even in non-political contexts)? 
 To examine this matter, this thesis first reviews relevant literature on ideology and 
motivated reasoning, ideology-congruent emotions (i.e., hope and fear), the motivation for 
emotion regulation, and incidental emotions before presenting its research question and 
hypotheses.  
Ideology and motivated reasoning 
Ideology is conceptualised as a stable set of complementary attitudes, beliefs, and 
values with emotional and motivational equities (Jost, Frederico, & Napier, 2009). Ideologies 
aim to describe or interpret the world and make sense of it. People can form an ideology by 
envisioning a certain worldview, hoping to attain economic, social, and political ideals (Jost, 
Frederico, & Napier, 2009). 
Erikson and Tedin (2003) offer a general and uncontroversial definition of political 
ideology, calling it ‘a set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be 
achieved’. Jost, Federico, and Napier (2009) found that motivational and cognitive structures 
are important in ideology. Openness or resistance to change and acceptance or rejection of 
inequality are generally the two dimensions that determine whether someone is a leftist 
(openness to change; acceptance of inequality) or a rightist (resistance to change; rejection of 
inequality) (Jost, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003).  
Relational motives, epistemic motives, and existential motives explain why people 
retain certain political ideas once they are exposed to them (Jost et al., 2009). According to 
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Hogg (2007), the motivation to maintain one’s ideology fulfills a need to maintain one’s 
identity, which explains why people are motivated to maintain their ideologies. Several 
processes help and motivate people to maintain and justify their ideologies, including 
motivated reasoning, which is a biased-decision-making phenomenon that is affected by 
directional goals (Kunda, 1990). This biased decision-making indicates that people are more 
likely to generate conclusions when they want to believe those conclusions, and directional 
goals most likely serve this desired outcome. Moreover, people can merge their own 
conclusions with a leftist or rightist ideology, regardless of how reasonable the justifications 
for those conclusion are, solely because they desire a particular outcome.  
Similarly, Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, and Chamberlin (2002) have found 
that leftists and rightists are both prone to forming personal attributions when they form 
attributions about social problems. Their research revealed that people were willing to correct 
these personal attributions only when they seemed incongruent with their moral beliefs or 
political ideology. In that case, people were willing to consider situational factors to maintain 
or justify their ideology. This phenomenon is called motivation correction. The tendency of 
people to favour, interpret, or pursue information that is congruent with their preexisting 
beliefs is known as confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998).  
Research on motivated reasoning led Pliskin et al. (in preparation) to conclude that 
people believe that hope or fear justifies their ideology, which leads them to experience hope 
and fear in the context of intergroup conflict. They furthermore determined not only that 
cognitive processes can help people to maintain their ideologies but also that ideologically 
congruent emotions (i.e., hope and fear) have been found to play an important role in 
justifying ideology. 
Ideologically congruent emotions 
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According to Frijda (2004), emotions are reactions that regulate a biological system, 
which aims to promote (directly or indirectly) the physiological states that benefit survival. 
However, they also influence cognitive well-being. More specifically, emotions are 
conscious or unconscious processes that include cognitive appraisal, motivational aspects, 
affect and behavioural aspects (Frijda, 2004). Emotional experiences derive their identities 
from action-readiness awareness and appraisal (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). 
Emotions have moreover been found to influence attitudes and behaviour (Frijda, 2004). 
Central to this study are group-based emotions, which people who identify with a 
particular group often experience (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). These emotions can 
rationalise certain situations that are significant to the group’s values and affect intergroup 
behaviour, including motivating components (Kessler & Hollbach, 2005). A study that Tamir 
(2016) conducted indicates that emotional preferences (i.e., desired emotional states) may be 
linked to the perceived importance of certain motives. When a motive seems important in a 
particular context, a person’s emotional preferences may adjust for a brief time if the adjusted 
emotion seems more consistent with the motive. Therefore, when groups share the same 
important motive, all members may adjust their emotional preferences accordingly.  
 Porat et al. (2016) suggest that emotional preferences within groups influence how 
these groups react to political events. Furthermore, group-based emotions contribute to the 
feelings of an in-group versus out-group perception (Mackie et al., 2000), which connects to 
the conclusion that Pliskin et al. (in preparation) proposed linking hope to a leftist ideology 
and fear to a rightist ideology. Jost et al. (2003) state that leftists and rightists are 
distinguished by the value of social change versus the value of tradition (Pliskin et al., in 
preparation). Hope and fear represent these values well, since they both relate to change and 
uncertainty. In addition, hope and fear are both effective responses to situations that include 
change, resulting in more positive or negative outcomes. This thesis on the relationship 
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between these emotions and political ideology review them separately to create a better 
understanding of how hope and fear work and what triggers them in leftists and rightists, 
respectively. 
When people feel dissatisfied with life and seek positive change, feelings of hope are 
likely to occur. Hope is an apparent future-oriented construct (Alarcon, Bowling, & Khazon, 
2013) that consists of positive effect (Snyder, Ferldman, Taylor, Schroeder, & Adams, 2000). 
The experience of hope requires motivation, but it also requires the belief in a positive 
outcome, which gives hope a cognitive aspect (Lazarus, 1999). Hope is goal-directed, 
meaning that a high-hope person may think of ways to solve a problem by seeking new 
methods for attaining goals, also known as pathways thinking (Snyder, Ferldman, Taylor, 
Schroeder, & Adams, 2000). Accordingly, the research that Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Porat, & 
Bar-tal (2014) conducted ties the experience of hope to a higher indulgence of peace and 
creative solutions during a relatively negative situation (i.e., intergroup conflict). 
Additionally, creativity and flexibility are two characteristics that go hand in hand with hope 
(Jarymowicks, 2006) and thus with leftist ideology, since leftists are often associated with 
tolerance for ambiguity. Finally, the study that Pliskin et al. (in preparation) organised ties the 
experience of hope to ideology by linking the leftists’ belief that hope justifies their ideology 
to their motivation to experience hope during intergroup conflict.  
On the contrary, fear facilitates an increased chance of survival by causing 
psychological and physiological reactions when a person perceives danger (Bar-Tal, 2001). 
Fear, as a vital emotion, materialises in the present but is based on a memorised past. Fear is 
linked to conservatism, and can function either consciously or subconsciously (Jarymowicks 
& Bar-Tal, 2006). Moreover, fear for change is often associated with a rightist ideology, as 
rightists are more prone to dogmatism than leftists (Jost et al., 2009). Dogmatism entails that 
people accept principles as undeniably true without considering conflicting evidence or 
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opinions. These characterisations demonstrate that rightists seem more prone to experience 
the fear of change and changing values. Accordingly, the research that Cohen-Chen et al. 
(2014) conducted ties the experience of fear to a lower perceived willingness to promote a 
resolution in conflict. Additionally, the research that Pliskin et al. (in preparation) organised 
ties the experience of fear to ideology by linking the rightists’ belief that fear justifies their 
ideology to their motivation to experience fear during intergroup conflict.  
Even so, the link between the belief that hope or fear justifies a person’s ideology and 
the experience of that emotion afterwards, does not provide evidence that people experience 
hope and fear more often in situations that are unrelated to the justification of ideology. In the 
research that Pliskin et al. (in preparation) directed, participants likely knew that the study 
was closely related to ideology and ideology justification matters throughout, which indicates 
that this research used only integral emotions. Integral emotions are targeted directly in the 
immediate situation (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003), indicating a cause-effect relationship. 
Incidental emotions, conversely, were not considered in this study. These emotions are 
irrelevant to the context of a current decision-making situation (Loewenstein et al., 2003) and 
are unrelated to a clear target in the immediate situation. Therefore, incidental emotions are 
an important part of the present research. Will leftists and rightists still feel more motivation 
to experience hope or fear, respectively, when they are not triggered beforehand by 
ideologically relevant stimuli? Alternatively, people may adjust their motivations to 
experience hope or fear only when triggered by their ideological beliefs. Accordingly, people 
sometimes consciously regulate their emotions to achieve certain goals. 
Motivation for emotion regulation 
Emotion regulation is the process people use to influence the emotions they 
experience (Gross, 2002). In other words, individuals may influence which emotion they 
want to experience in certain situations. Emotion regulation is useful for insights into how 
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people experience emotions, which ones they feel, when they feel them, and how they 
regulate them (Gross, 2014). This process occurs at a conscious and more unconscious 
level (Gross, 2002). At a more conscious level, a motivation is generally the cause of a 
change in emotion. Motivations for emotion regulation can occur for hedonic purposes and 
instrumental benefits. People who actively try to remain positive when a negative event 
occurs are motivated by hedonic purposes, meaning that they try to maximise their positive 
feelings and minimise their negative feelings. People can also be motivated by the 
instrumental benefits that their regulated emotions might offer (Tamir, 2016). For example, 
Tamir, Mitchell, and Gross (2008) found that people preferred anger-inducing activities when 
they knew that they were going to play a confrontational game afterwards. In contrast, people 
preferred a more calm-inducing or even exciting activity when they knew that they were 
going to play a nonconfrontational game afterwards.  
An important part of the present research is ideology-related motivation. If a person 
were to read a newspaper article on war refugees safely escaping their country, that person 
could choose to feel hopeful for their escaping war or fearful of their entering his or her 
country. Previous research has demonstrated that people believe that hope and fear justify 
their ideologies. Therefore, people can perceive the benefits of regulating these emotions 
more often within their ideological contexts. However, it has not yet been studied whether 
leftists and rightists are also motivated to regulate these ideologically congruent emotions 
more often in non-political contexts. 
The present research 
Prior studies have demonstrated the importance of people finding justification for 
their beliefs, also known as motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990). In addition, emotions may 
serve as a motivation, and people are thus more likely to experience an emotion to justify a 
goal, as in justifying ideology. Previous research has revealed a relationship between rightists 
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using fear to justify their ideology and leftists using hope to justify their ideology, both in 
politically relevant contexts (Pliskin et al., in preparation). This study investigates whether 
leftists and rightists believe that hope and fear justify their ideologies respectively and 
whether they are thus more motivated to experience those emotions beyond the relevant 
targets of these emotions. Because hope and fear are closely related to change and 
uncertainty, it seems reasonable to assume that leftists and rightists are more motivated to 
experience ideologically congruent emotions when change and uncertainty occur, regardless 
of any political relevance. So, whereas Pliskin et al. (in preparation) studied whether people 
wanted to experience hope and fear when these emotions were integral to their ideologies, the 
present research considers incidental and integral emotions to rule out the possibility that 
only the participants’ awareness of the ideologically relevant stimuli caused the significant 
findings of Pliskin et al. (in preparation).  
Thus, this thesis intends to answer the following research question: Do people with a 
leftist or rightist worldview feel that hope or fear justifies their ideology, and are these people 
therefore more motivated to experience these emotions, regardless of the political relevance 
of the emotions’ targets? In other words, do leftists generally want to feel more hope, and do 
rightists generally want to feel more fear, even when the emotions do not have ideologically 
relevant targets? And is this effect mediated by the belief that hope or fear justifies their 
ideology? 
Based on the aforementioned literature, this thesis hypothesises that leftists believe 
that hope justifies their ideology more than rightists do, and leftists are therefore more 
motivated to experience hope, regardless of the political relevance of the emotions’ targets. It 
also hypothesises that rightists believe that fear justifies their ideology more than leftists, and 
rightists are therefore more motivated to experience fear, regardless of the political relevance 
of the emotions’ targets. 
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To provide answers for the research questions and hypotheses, the present study 
investigates participants’ motivation to experience hope and fear by using ideologically 
relevant and ideologically irrelevant stimuli in the form of article headlines. These headlines 
contain ideologically relevant or irrelevant information designed to induce either hope or 
fear. Accordingly, participants are required to read several article headlines and rank them in 
order of their perceived reading desirability. Furthermore, several questionnaires are provided 
to collect information concerning the participants’ political orientations, demographics, 
additional questionnaires (regarding control variables), and the participants’ perceived belief 
that hope and fear justify their ideologies.  
Method 
Participants 
A two-wave study was employed to obtain a balanced sample of leftists, centrists, and 
rightists. The first questionnaire was used to measure the participants’ ideologies, which were 
based on self-reported beliefs. The second questionnaire measured participants’ motivation to 
experience hope or fear; this behavioural measure was based on how participants ranked 
newspaper headlines (which provoked hope or fear).  
Two hundred thirty-seven Dutch-speaking participants were recruited, their ages 
ranging from eighteen to seventy-eight (Mage = 26.86; SD = 13.14). Seventy-eight identified 
as male, and 132 identified as female (Mgender = 1.56; SD = 0.50). Participants, who received 
either one study credit or €3.50 for compensation, were recruited through various channels, 
including SONA (Leiden University research participation) and personal recruitment in and 
around the University of Leiden (Faculty of Social Sciences) and from personal networks. 
Participants completed the questionnaires in person at the lab at the University of Leiden 
(Faculty of Social Sciences), online, or through a combination of both methods. Recruitment 
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from personal networks was especially necessary when the research progressed and more 
rightist participants were needed to create a balanced ideology distribution.  
Of the 237 participants, 193 completed both questionnaires, eliminating 44 
participants from the research. Of these 193 participants, 184 required 300 seconds or more to 
complete the second questionnaire, which was considered a reasonable minimal time to do so 
attentively, eliminating nine participants. The final sample thus comprised 184 participants 
(Mage = 28.92; SD = 13.20). Seventy-one identified as leftist, fifty-eight as centrist, and fifty-
five as rightist. Seventy-eight identified as male and one hundred and six as female (Mgender = 
1.58; SD = 0.50). 
It is possible that the relatively brief interval between the two questionnaires 
influenced the answers of 45 participants to the second questionnaire. For this reason, all 
analyses were repeated without these 45 participants (who completed the first and second 
questionnaire within seven hours or less).  
Procedure 
Participants received an online (initial) questionnaire consisting of an information 
form, an informed consent form, and background and demographic questions. These 
background and demographic questions intended to determine their basic demographic data 
as well as their ideology, which was measured based on three dimensions: left versus right, 
conservative versus progressive, and economically versus socially economically liberal). 
After the participants had completed the initial questionnaire, they either arrived at the lab at 
a scheduled time on a scheduled date or were asked to complete the online general 
questionnaire at home (depending on whether they had the time to go to the lab). Participants 
were aware that participating in this study would require 30 minutes.  
On the date of their participation in completing the general questionnaire, participants 
were first asked to affirm their informed consent. Afterwards, the participants were led to 
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believe that they had to write a short paragraph about their beliefs and values shortly after 
responding to some additional questions. They were also informed that they would be able to 
read some additional articles that were unrelated to the topic (beliefs and values), supposedly 
because research had revealed that reading about unrelated topics before writing about beliefs 
and values improves writing skills. Hence, participants could rank article headlines in order 
based on their desire to read the articles, as there was insufficient time to read all of them. 
The central dependent variable was this headline-ranking task, measuring the extent to which 
participants were motivated to experience hope and fear. The pretest that was executed 
beforehand ensured that participants expected the headlines to be either hope-inducing or 
fear-inducing. 
 All participants viewed an equal amount of hope-inducing and fear-inducing 
headlines, but only half of them saw ideologically relevant headlines while the other half saw 
ideologically irrelevant headlines (both inducing hope and fear). Afterwards, when 
participants had finished ranking the headlines, they had to answer several related questions 
for empirical purposes. These questions concerned the self-reported belief that hope and fear 
justify one’s ideology regarding promotion versus prevention focus, trait anxiety, trait hope, 
and the tolerance of uncertainty. At last, when the participants finished completing all the 
questionnaires, they were debriefed and informed that they did not have to read articles or 
write a paragraph about their beliefs and values, as these tasks were not truly relevant to the 
study’s aim. 
Materials  
The initial questionnaire was used to measure demographics and political ideology. 
The demographics included the participants’ ages, whether they were university students (yes 
or no), and their current education level (e.g., 1 = high school; 5 = master’s degree or higher). 
The questions that measured ideology were answered on a seven-point scale, ranging from 
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one to seven; these included a question about how participants would define their political 
orientation (e.g., 1 = extreme left; 4 = centre; 7 = extreme right). A question about how 
conservative or progressive people defined themselves in terms of political opinions (e.g., 1 = 
very progressive; 4 = neither progressive nor conservative; 7 = very conservative). Lastly, a 
question about how liberal people defined themselves in terms of political opinions (e.g., 1 = 
very social; 4 = neither progressive nor conservative; 7 = very conservative). After the 
political orientation questions, there was one question about how religious people defined 
themselves, ranging from 1 = atheist to 5 = very religious. Participants were then asked to 
compare their household income to the average Dutch household income (€4,100) using a 
five-point response scale, ranging from 1 = much lower than average to 5 = much higher than 
average. Finally, it was discovered that the study had neglected to include a measure to 
determine the gender its participants. This information was subsequently collected by asking 
participants via email whether they identify as male or female. 
A questionnaire from Higgins, Friedman, Harlow, Ison, Ayduk, and Taylor (2001) 
was used to measure promotion versus prevention focus. This questionnaire included eleven 
questions that measured three different answering scales. Questions one through eight had a 
response scale that ranged from 1 = never or seldom to 5 = very often; question nine had a 
response scale that ranged from 1 = never true to 5 = very often true; and questions 10 and 11 
had a response scale ranging from 1 = certainly false to 5 = certainly true. The promotion 
focus subscale covered six of the questions while the prevention focus subscale covered five. 
The items from the prevention focus subscale (including two, four, six, and eight) were 
recoded before the analyses. The internal consistency was found to be good (Cronbach’s α = 
0.81). 
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) was used to measure trait anxiety (Roberts, 
2013). This questionnaire included two subscales—the state scale and the trait scale—which 
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were measured with the answers to seven questions. Participants were first asked to rate their 
anxiety in the moment for the state and trait scales and then asked to rate their anxiety in 
general. The response scales ranged from 1 = almost never to 4 = almost always, with higher 
scores indicating more trait anxiety. A mean score was computed for this scale before the 
analyses and presented a good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.87). 
 This study included a brief version of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (Buhr & 
Dugas, 2002) to measure the intolerance of uncertainty. This scale represented four 
structures: the idea that uncertainty is stressful, the idea that uncertainty causes the inability 
to act, the idea that uncertainty is unfair, and the idea that uncertainty is negative and should 
be avoided. The response scale was the same for all twenty-seven items (e.g., 1 = not at all 
characteristic of me; 5 = entirely characteristic of me). Examples of items included ‘It’s 
unfair having no guarantees in life’ and ‘The smallest doubt can stop me from acting’. Mean 
scores were computed for this scale before the analyses and indicated a good internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.85). 
The revised Life Orientation Test (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994) was used to 
measure optimism versus pessimism. This test included an optimism (three items) and a 
pessimism (three items) subscale, with the four remaining items being used as filler items. 
For this questionnaire, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed 
with ten statements. The response scale was the same for all ten statements, ranging from one 
to four (e.g., 1 = strongly disagree; 4 = strongly agree). Examples of items included ‘I’m 
always optimistic about my future’ and ‘I rarely count on good things happening to me’. A 
mean score was computed for this scale, which had a sufficient internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.65). 
 The adult trait hope questionnaire (Snyder, 2000) was used to measure the control 
variable of trait hope. This questionnaire included twelve items (e.g., ‘There are lots of ways 
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around any problem’). These items had the same response scales, ranging from one to eight 
(e.g., 1 = definitely false; 4 = slightly false; 8= definitely true). Items three, five, seven, and 
11 were reverse coded to create one overall hope indicator. A mean score was computed for 
this scale before the analyses and had a good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.81). 
 The evaluations of emotions scales (Netzer, Kim, and Tamir, 2015) were used to 
measure participants’ evaluations of hope and fear. Participants were asked to answer 
questions on a continuum located between two labels; one side represented positive labels 
(good, useful, wise, valuable, and necessary) while the opposite side presented negative 
labels (bad, harmful, foolish, useless, and unnecessary). The extent to which participants 
agreed with one of two labels was measured on an eight-point response scale located between 
each pair of labels (more positive versus more negative). The subscale evaluation of fear in 
general consisted of items one, two, three, four, and five. Mean scores were computed, and 
the internal consistency was found to be good (Cronbach’s α = 0.85). The subscale evaluation 
of hope in general consisted of items six, seven, eight, nine, and 10. Mean scores were 
computed, and the internal consistency was found to be excellent (Cronbach’s α = 0.92). The 
subscale evaluation of fear in a political context consisted of items 11, 12, 13, 14, and 16. 
Mean scores were computed, and the internal consistency was found to be excellent 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.89). Finally, the subscale evaluation of hope in a political context 
consisted of items 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20. Mean scores were computed, and the internal 
consistency was found to be excellent (Cronbach’s α = 0.90). 
 A modified questionnaire, adapted from Pliskin et al. (in preparation), was used to 
measure the degree to which participants felt that their emotional experiences justified their 
political ideology. This questionnaire included eight items, half of them relating to hope and 
the other half relating to fear. All items had the same response scale, ranging from one to six 
(e.g., 1 = completely disagree; 6 = completely agree). Mean scores were computed for both 
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subscales before the analyses. Items one, three, five, and seven measured the justification of 
ideology through the experience of hope. Examples of these items include ‘Wanting to 
experience hope justifies my political beliefs’ and ‘Wanting to experience hope in general 
reinforces my political beliefs’. The internal consistency of this subscale was found to be 
good (Cronbach’s α = 0.86). Items two, four, six, and eight measured the justification of 
ideology through the experience of fear. Examples of these items include ‘Wanting to 
experience fear justifies my political beliefs’ and ‘Wanting to experience fear in general 
reinforces my political beliefs’. The internal consistency of this subscale was also good 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.86). 
This study created a headline-ranking task to measure the motivation of its 
participants to read hope-inducing or fear-inducing articles. A score of one indicated the 
highest reading desirability and six the lowest. Twelve headlines were created to represent 
two conditions: six article headlines included ideologically relevant information while the 
other six included ideologically irrelevant information. Within these two conditions, three 
headlines were hope-inducing, and three headlines were fear-inducing. Thus, the motivation 
of participants to experience hope or fear was measured by studying the preferred headlines 
in both conditions (ideologically relevant and irrelevant). 
Statistical analysis 
The data was analysed by using several analyses of variance (ANOVA) and 
covariance (ANCOVA) to test for possible mediation.  
Results 
A correlation table (Table 1) was created to examine correlations among the central 
variables, control variables, and demographic variables. The control variables of prevention 
focus and promotion focus were included due to their perceived similarities to the preference 
THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN JUSTIFYING AND EXPERIENCING EMOTIONS  18  
  
for fear and the preference for hope, respectively; the demographic variables of education, 
age, and religiosity were included because they correlated the highest with the dependent 
variables (the preference for fear-inducing headlines and the preference for hope-inducing 
headlines). However, none of these correlations were actually significant. Finally, the 
demographic variable of gender was included due to its high significant correlation with the 
dependent variables. 
Ideology justification beliefs 
Because the correlations between the ideology justification variables (hope and fear) 
and the dependent variables (overall hope and fear preference regarding article headlines) 
were not significant, they did not meet the criteria for mediation analysis. In conclusion, this 
study was not able to analyse whether participants’ motivation to choose hope-inducing 
versus fear-inducing articles was produced to justify their ideology. 
Effects of political orientation and condition on overall hope and fear preference 
The first univariate ANOVA investigated the effects of each participant’s preference 
for hope over fear. It was conducted to determine whether political orientation (left, centre, or 
right) and condition (politically relevant versus politically irrelevant) interactively influenced 
the dependent variable of overall hope preference (i.e., the preference for hope-inducing 
headlines across all participants). There was a significant main effect of political orientation 
on the overall hope preference (F[2, 178] = 5.10; p = 0.007). Additionally, Tukey’s HSD test 
was used as a post hoc test for the independent variable of political orientation to determine 
which differences were significant. The results indicated that in the current study, leftists 
revealed a significant preference for hope-inducing headlines compared to rightists (Mdifference 
= 0.43; p = 0.005). These results also suggested that leftists have a higher preference for 
hope-inducing headlines (M = 3.95; SE = 0.75) compared to centrists (M = 3.95; SE = 0.77) 
and rightists (M = 3.75; SE = 0.77). Moreover, there was a non-significant effect of condition 
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on overall hope preference (F[1, 178] = 0.45; p= 0.50). This effect indicates that the degree 
to which participants preferred hope-inducing headlines did not depend on whether the 
headlines were politically relevant. The interaction effect was also non-significant, with F(2, 
178) = 0.02; p= 0.98. 
After the exclusion of 45 participants, for whom insufficient time had passed between 
the initial and general questionnaires (N = 139), the main effect of ideology was still 
significant (F[2, 133] = 4.03; p = 0.020). The interaction effect of political ideology and 
condition remained non-significant, with F(2, 133) = 0.44; p = 0.646. Furthermore, the main 
effect of condition also remained non-significant (F[1, 133] = 0.19; p = 0.663). Pairwise 
comparisons (performed with the Bonferroni correction) indicated the same pattern as before 
the exclusion. 
As for rightists, the abovementioned results were also obtained, when an ANOVA 
was conducted with preference for fear-inducing headlines as the dependent variable. 
Because, preference for hope-inducing headlines and the preference for fear-inducing 
headlines are located on the same spectrum and therefore complement each other. 
Headline preferences  
 Figure 1 displays the mean ranking-scores on the four article-headline categories: 
politically-relevant and hope inducing, politically-relevant and fear inducing, politically-
irrelevant and hope inducing, politically-irrelevant and fear inducing. Based on eighty-three 
participants in the politically-relevant condition and one hundred and one in the politically-
irrelevant condition.  
Effects after controlling for demographic and control variables 
Covariates were added to the abovementioned ANOVA to test whether they influence 
the significance of the independent variables, with the aim of examining the effects of a 
participant’s preference for hope over fear further. The following covariates were eventually 
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added to the analysis: ideology justification hope, ideology justification fear, promotion 
focus, prevention focus, education, gender, age, and religiosity. None of these demographic 
variables and control variables significantly altered the results, except for gender. After 
controlling for gender, the main effect of political orientation on overall hope preference 
became non-significant, with F[1, 133] = 1.86; p= 0.158. The main effect of condition on 
overall hope preference remained non-significant (F[1, 169] = 0.62; p= 0.431), as did the 
interaction between political orientation and condition on overall hope preference (F[1, 169] 
= 0.11; p = 0.897). 
After the exclusion of 45 participants, for whom insufficient time had passed between 
the initial and general questionnaires (N = 139), the main effect of ideology was non-
significant (F[2, 124] = 1.017; p = 0.365. The main effect of condition remained non-
significant (F[2, 124] = 0.128; p = 0.721), and the interaction effect of political ideology and 
condition remained non-significant (F[2, 124] = 0.504; p = 0.606). Again, as for rightists, the 
results obtained for fear preference and hope preference are fully complementary in the 
opposite direction. 
Discussion 
Hypotheses and findings 
The purpose of this thesis was to establish whether leftists and rightists believe that 
hope and fear justify their ideologies and whether they are therefore more motivated to 
experience these emotions, regardless of the political relevance of the emotions’ targets. It 
also intended to provide evidence that previous studies were restricted to ideologically 
relevant stimuli by adding a politically irrelevant condition. This thesis first hypothesised that 
the present research would reveal results similar to those of Pliskin et al. (in preparation) 
regarding ideology justification beliefs (i.e., hope and fear) having an impact on a person’s 
motivation to experience hope and fear in political contexts. However, no similar evidence 
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was found based on its failure to confirm a correlation between the variables measuring 
justification beliefs and the dependent variables (overall hope and fear preference). This 
result means that, contrary to the hypothesis, ideology justification beliefs do not mediate the 
effect of political ideology on article preference. Due to this outcome, the present research 
also found no evidence to support the prediction that ideology justification beliefs regarding 
hope and fear impact a person’s motivation to experience hope and fear in non-political 
contexts. 
Nevertheless, the results of this investigation indicated that being a leftist is a 
significant predictor for an individual’s overall motivation to experience hope while being a 
rightist is a significant predictor for an individual’s overall motivation to experience fear. 
Moreover, the political relevance of the article headlines did not seem to affect the preference 
for hope-inducing or fear-inducing headlines, since no significant effect of condition on 
overall fear or hope could be found and no interaction between ideology and condition could 
be corroborated. To conclude, leftists seemed to have a higher preference for hope-inducing 
headlines whereas rightists seemed to have a higher preference for fear-inducing headlines in 
both the politically relevant and politically irrelevant conditions, which was in line with the 
hypothesis. 
However, when multiple control variables were considered, including the 
demographic variable of gender, the effect of ideology being a predictor for the overall 
motivation to experience hope or fear disappeared. To be specific, adding gender to the 
equation caused this unexpected turn of events. 
Study limitations and suggestions for future research 
This study did find a limitation regarding the variable of justification beliefs that did 
not affect the relationship between ideology and the preference for hope-inducing or fear-
inducing articles. One difference between this study and the study that Pliskin et al. (in 
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preparation) conducted is that the present sample consisted of Dutch participants compared to 
Israeli and American participants. It seems reasonable to assume that different cultures 
perceive politics differently, even though this assumption does not provide an answer as to 
why these results were derived from both Israeli and American samples but not this Dutch 
sample.  
However, when comparing the views of Europeans and Americans on inequality, 
Alesina, Di Tella, and MacCulloch (2004) found that Europeans dislike inequality 
significantly more than Americans do. Additionally, Jost et al. (2003) concluded that the 
acceptance or rejection of equality is important when determining whether a person is a leftist 
or rightist. However, the results of Alesina et al. (2004) indicated that Europeans and 
Americans differ in their feelings towards equality. Furthermore, Jost et al. (2003) also found 
that openness and resistance to change are important indicators of whether a person is a leftist 
or a rightist, respectively. People in the Netherlands tend towards a centrist ideology, which 
may indicate that the Dutch have more moderate opinions towards change. It therefore seems 
plausible that different cultures perceive politics differently and thus differ in their beliefs 
about hope and fear justifying ideology. For further research it would be useful to investigate 
cultural differences in politics and ideology to investigate whether people therefore differ in 
their beliefs about hope and fear justifying their ideology. Based on the different views that 
Americans and Dutch people have, regarding politics and justifying ideology, it might be 
necessary for future research to focus on each country separately, since they may acquire 
different approaches and measurements.  
Another relevant limitation to this study was the unevenly distributed sample that 
contained more leftist participants than to rightist participants, which may explain the higher 
mean rankings for hope-inducing articles among participants. There were also more female 
participants in the sample compared to male participants. Furthermore, gender presented a 
THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN JUSTIFYING AND EXPERIENCING EMOTIONS  23  
  
strong significant correlation with the dependent variable of article preference, which 
rendered the results on the effect of ideology on article preference non-significant once the 
study was corrected for gender. A possible explanation for this result is the gender gap, which 
indicates the differences between males and females concerning several aspects. Since gender 
apparently explains much of the variance in preferring certain hope-inducing or fear-inducing 
headlines, gender must have therefore interfered with the relationship between ideology and 
article preference (before the study was corrected for gender). This could be due to more 
females participating in this study than to men.   
 In addition, the gender gap in the Netherlands might be more important than 
previously thought. The Global Gender Gap Report from the World Economic Forum has 
stated that gender differences in the Netherlands have increased significantly in the last few 
years (Van Slingerland, 2018). Moreover, a study conducted by Norrander and Wilcox (2008) 
showed that women who are single and obtain a high education, are more liberal than other 
women who obtain a lower education. This research also indicated, that men in general, move 
in a more conservative direction. The present study’s sample consisted mostly of female 
university students, and most of our rightist participants were male. These differences in 
preference for hope-inducing and fear-inducing articles between males and females are a 
possible explanation as to why gender was found to be significant in this study but does not 
yet offer any answers. For future research, it would be useful to take differences between men 
and women (gender gap) in to account. It may also be interesting to find a more balanced 
participants’ sample, with more variety in education level, a more balanced distribution 
between men and women and a more similar distribution of leftists and rightists.  
Study-implication 
This study contributed to the literature on incidental and integral emotions 
(Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003), by first adding a unique politically-irrelevant condition in 
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which participants were not directly targeted by politically-relevant stimuli. Second, by not 
informing the participants about the study’s true aim (i.e justifying ideology and the 
motivation to experience hope and fear) until the participants were fully debriefed at the end 
of their participation. 
 As a result in this study, no significant differences were found in the motivation to 
experience ideology-congruent emotions (hope and fear) in leftists and rightists when 
targeted with political or non-political stimuli, respectively (when gender was not 
considered). Which indicates that leftists and rightists were more motivated to experience 
hope and fear, respectively, when these emotions were integral and incidental to their 
ideologies. However, the results of this study may also indicate that the justification of one’s 
ideology, only mediates the effect of ideology and the motivation of leftists and rightists to 
experience hope or fear, when people’s emotions were integral to their ideologies. Even 
though as stated above, it is not yet clear how incidental emotions precisely contribute to this 
research, this study does provide unique information regarding incidental and integral 
emotions that can be used in future research. 
Conclusion 
This thesis formulated the following research question: Do people with a leftist or 
rightist worldview feel that hope or fear justifies their ideology, and are these people 
therefore more motivated to experience these ideology-congruent emotions, regardless of the 
political relevance of the emotions’ targets? An investigation into this issue attempted to find 
evidence to support the results that Pliskin et al. (in preparation) obtained regarding the belief 
that hope and fear justify ideology and thus motivate people to experience hope or fear in a 
politically relevant context and even added a politically-irrelevant condition. This 
investigation found no evidence to validate its hypotheses, as it failed to find evidence for a 
mediating effect of the justification of one’s ideology on ideology and article preference;  
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however, it did find affirmative evidence for leftists’ and rightists’ motivation to 
experience more hope and fear, respectively, in both politically-relevant and politically-
irrelevant conditions when gender was not considered. It would be interesting for future 
research to further investigate the possibility that people’s belief about hope or fear justifying 
their ideology, only mediates the relationship between ideology and the motivation to 
experience hope or fear respectively, when emotions are integral to one’s ideology. It would 
also be useful to investigate cultural differences in politics to test whether people therefore 
differ in their beliefs about hope and fear justifying their ideology. Finally, to generalise the 
current results, it may be interesting to further explore the relationship between leftists and 
rightists regarding their preferences for hope and fear by inventing new studies. 
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 Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations  
    M SD    1  2     3    4          5          6   7     8   9   10 11 
1.         Ideology (+ = Rightist) 
 
1.91 0.83  1  - - - - - - - - - - 
2.          Overall Hope preference 3.75 0.77 -.23&&   1 - - - - - - - - - 
3.          Overall Fear preference 3.25 0.77 .23&&  -1&& 1 - - - - - - - - 
4.         Ideology Justification Hope   3.59 3.59 -.22&&  .02 -.02 1 - - - - - - - 
5.         Ideology Justification Fear 2.92 1.00 .23&&  .00 .00 .26&& 1 - - - - - - 
6.         Promotion-Focus 3.73 0.58 .04  -.06 .06 .15& .08 1 - - - - - 
7.         Prevention-Focus 3.63 0.75 -.05  .09 -.09 .22&& -.01 -.02 1 - - - - 
8.         Education 3.24 1.13 -.04  .09 -.09 .00 -.07 .15& -.06 1 - - - 
9.        Gender 1.58 0.50 -.37&&  .30&& -.30&& .074 .20&& -.13 .17& -.03 1 - - 
10.      Age 28.92 13.20 .11  -.06 .06 -.01 -.10 .02 .33 -.27&& .17 1 - 
11.     Religiosity 2.16  0.1 -.069  -.08 -.08 .10 -.00 -.01 .07 -.11 .11 .07 1 
 
*p • .05. **p • .01. 
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Figure 1. Mean rankings of headline preferences (N = 184). Higher scores indicate higher article rankings and article preference. 
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